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One of the lessons of the crisis was that too much risk relative to required capital was concentrated in the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In the years since, their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), has focused on laying off a considerable share of the credit risk that the GSEs take into the private market through what has come to be known as the credit risk transfer (CRT) program. The groundwork for this program was laid in 2012, under acting FHFA director Ed DeMarco, with the first "Strategic Plan for Enterprise Conservatorships." The program was seen as a way to contract the GSEs' footprint in the market by allowing private investors to bear some or all of the credit risk (FHFA 2012) . In 2014, under FHFA director Mel Watt, the emphasis was on "shift [ing] risk to private market participants and away from the enterprises in a responsible way that does not reduce liquidity or adversely impact the availability of mortgage credit" (FHFA 2014) .
The CRT program has been a huge success and has grown rapidly since program inception in 2013, with the GSEs transferring the risk on an ever-larger amount of reference collateral each year. As the program has grown, the number of risk sharing structures has increased. In addition to Fannie Mae's Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS) program and Freddie Mac's Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR) program, credit risk transfer programs include reinsurance coverage done after the acquisition of the credit risk, as well as front-end transactions, in which the credit risk is transferred at collateral acquisition.
This rapid expansion of volume to date is not apt to continue because of rising interest rates and declining origination volumes,. Although the GSEs can compensate for some of this loss of volume by transferring more of the risk on loans already targeted for risk transfer or expanding the types of loans that could be considered, these steps would likely be insufficient or just barely sufficient to compensate for the decline in refinancing activity, let alone allow for continued volume growth.
Although we are confident the GSEs will continue to refine and innovate their offerings, we believe the future growth of credit risk transfer volume lies outside the GSE space. We have already seen a notable expansion in CRT by the mortgage insurance (MI) companies, and we could eventually see trading in CRT indexes and the emergence of CRT issuance by banks, should they get capital relief. The market outside the GSE channel shows more potential for expansion.
Quantifying the Growth and Outlook for the GSE CRT Business
In 2012, the FHFA introduced the notion that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should reduce their overall credit risk, and reduce the risk they pose to taxpayers while they are in conservatorship, by laying off the risk from the GSEs onto the private market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac implemented CRT programs in 2013; exhibit 1 shows their evolution. In 2013, the GSEs transferred part of the credit risk on $90 billion of unpaid principal balance on mortgage loans. By 2017, this had increased to $689 billion. Cumulatively, the GSEs have transferred part of the credit risk on $2.1 trillion of acquisitions ($1.25 trillion from Fannie Mae and $873 billion from Freddie Mac). As of the end of 2017, the transferred credit risk has a combined risk in force of about $69 billion, or 3.26 percent of the unpaid principal balance. Stated differently, the GSEs have obtained coverage for up to 3.26 percent of losses on the $2.1 trillion of covered mortgage loans. This is a significant amount of mortgage risk in a sector where Basel capital standards traditionally assigned 4 percent capital requirements.
Exhibit 1: Credit Risk Transfer Programs 2013-17
Enterprise single-family mortgage CRT activity; reference pool UPB, $billions Sources: December 2017 Federal Housing Finance Agency single-family CRT progress report and the Urban Institute. Note: CRT = credit risk transfer; UPB = unpaid principal balance.
The growth has occurred because of continuous program innovation. Initially, backend CRT included only collateral with a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio between 60.01 and 80 percent. This was quickly expanded to loans with LTV ratios greater than 80 percent. The early transactions had a 10-year final maturity and were based on a preset severity schedule.
Since 2015, transactions have had a 12.5-year final maturity and have been based on actual losses, allowing the GSEs to better offset their credit risk. Initially, the GSEs sold only the mezzanine tranches. Now, they are selling the first-loss tranches. They have experimented with the collateral buckets such as Home Affordable Refinance Program loans, 15-year collateral, and senior-subordinate structures for non-TBA (to-be-announced) collateral. The program has also grown to include CRT at origination (front-end structures), such as lender recourse, MI pool polices, forward reinsurance, and other MI alternatives. The GSEs have also shortened the lag between mortgage issuance and CRT. Finkelstein, Strzodka, and Vickery (2018) point out that for the recent CRT reference pool, loan age at origination averages only 4 to 6 months, down sharply from more than 12 months at program inception. And the innovation continues. To obtain more favorable regulatory and tax treatment of foreign investors and for real estate investment trusts, the GSEs have announced that future deals will be done using a re-REMIC structure rather than as a structured debt issuance. 1 To make this change, they must make a REMIC election on the underlying mortgage loans. 1 REMICs are real estate mortgage investment conduits. For foreign investors, the re-REMIC structure eliminates the tax timing mismatch between when the benefits of the investment are recognized and when the losses are realized. For real estate investment trust investors, the current debt issuances are good assets for real estate investment trust qualification, as they are issued by the GSEs, but the income is not good income, as the security is considered a derivative, not a mortgage security. A re-REMIC structure will allow the income to be treated as mortgage income. We estimate that a borrower finds a refinance financially worthwhile only when there will be a roughly 75 basis-point savings between the rate they pay on their current mortgage and the rate on a new mortgage. According to Bankrate data, the average borrower will pay fees of $2,084 on a $200,000 loan, not including title search fees or title insurance. 2 If we add 1 percent for title search and title insurance, the required up-front cost to refinance a $200,000 loan is 2.04 percent, or about 51 basis points in outright costs. In addition, the borrower needs to save at least 25 basis points because of the hassle factor. Thus, an average borrower would require a mortgage rate of 3.42 percent or lower to refinance. Rates were more than 100 basis points higher than that level as of May 2018. Can the GSEs Sustain Current CRT Production Levels?
Given the expected declines in collateral volume, can Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sustain current production volumes? They can if they find a way to do more CRT on their existing book of business. There are four possible avenues through which this can occur: (1) increasing the collateral base on new business that they target for CRT, (2) raising the detachment point on the existing CRT transactions to pick up more of the "catastrophic" risk, With the GSEs laying off the overwhelming majority of their risk on 30-year collateral with LTV ratios greater than 60 percent, most of what is not being used is low risk, either because the term is shorter than 30 years or because the LTV ratios are less than 60 percent.
In the CAS and STACR structures, the GSEs are buying protection against the first 4 percent of losses for deals with LTV ratios between 60.01 and 80 percent and the first 4.25 In some of the STACR deals from 2015 and early 2016, Freddie Mac laid off the risks on as much as the first 5.85 percent of the losses on deals with LTV ratios between 60.01 to 80 percent and as much as 6.4 percent on deals with LTV ratios between 80.01 and 97 percent. Subsequent deals were done with lower attachment points. We assume the GSEs determined this was noneconomic, as the cost of raising the attachment point to cover increasingly remote risk is high. In particular, if done through CAS and STACR, the bonds must be fully funded. Thus, the investor is tying up cash for a long time and requires a return on that capital; the cost of this to the GSEs is much higher than the residual risk.
This leaves two alternatives: laying off more first-loss risk or targeting legacy assets.
Both options are on the table, although it is not clear how economic they are. In the 2015-16 deals, there was one equity tranche, and a small amount of it was sold. In more recent deals, there are generally two equity tranches: the first 50 basis points of losses (B-2) and the tranche that takes loses between 50 and 100 basis points (B-1). The GSEs lay off less of the B-1 tranche than they do of the mezzanine tranches and in most recent deals have not laid off the first-loss B-2 tranche. The premiums are enough to cover the first-loss risk on these bonds. Fannie's guarantee fees on new acquisitions for 2017 averaged 57 basis points, while Freddie's averaged 51. With 10 basis points to the US Treasury and 7 basis points of administrative expenses, they are retaining 34 to 40 basis points of revenue. Thus, two years of revenue more than covers the maximum loss on the B-2 tranche. The GSEs have room to sell off more of their first-loss risk; the question is whether it is economic, and it may not be.
Many investors face high capital changes from holding first-loss bonds. Moreover, some losses are expected, even during normal periods. Insurance is often noneconomic for losses incurred under normal circumstances. Finally, many investors see the GSEs holding the first loss as their "skin in the game" and are more apt to invest in CRT if they see the GSEs with the first-loss exposure. It acts like a deductible in an insurance policy, a deterrent to lowering lending standards and raising default risk.
Similarly, the GSEs have not laid off the risk on their legacy book of business. They may view crisis-era loans that have long histories of on-time payments as containing less risk than is reflected in the market pricing. But they will not know until they try to lay off this risk.
We Expect Tension in the Back-End and FrontEnd Decisions Going Forward
Credit risk transfer has evolved. We can, broadly speaking, think of CRT as fitting into two categories: whether the transaction is done on securities in the GSE portfolios (back-end CRT) or whether the transaction is done at the point of GSE acquisition (front-end CRT). We can also classify the holder of the risk: capital markets or institution based. The CAS and transactions, they will look elsewhere and may not be available when the capital markets investors pull out.
There is no easy solution for this. We predict tension will be inherent in the program once the growth of CRT collateral stops, as it will require hard choices as to the trade-offs the GSEs are willing to make.
With CRT from the GSEs unlikely to grow, we believe there will be growth in CRT from other sources. In particular, we have seen interest in using CRT from mortgage insurers.
Bank CRT is a possibility if capital relief can be provided. Finally, we could see trading in the CRT indexes. We explore each of these below.
CRT Done by Mortgage Insurers
We believe mortgage insurers are the most promising area for CRT expansion. This expansion is valuable for the mortgage insurers and for the GSEs. The GSEs have considerable exposure to the mortgage insurers, and both the GSEs and the mortgage insurers are exposed to the risk of home price declines. If the mortgage insurers can transfer a portion of their risk, it reduces the GSE and taxpayer risk. We expect some of the other mortgage insurers to join, as the transactions make a great deal of sense. In particular, the transactions offer capital relief. The cash is put into a trust to pay claims or repay the bonds. The GSEs deduct the trust assets against the Private Mortgage Insurance Eligibility Requirements, required asset amounts. In addition, regulatory capital relief is offered at the state level, as these are considered to be reinsurance transactions.
These transactions also reduce the volatility of earnings, providing greater resiliency for the mortgage insurers under adverse market conditions. Equity markets should reward this lower volatility of earnings with a lower discount rate and a higher stock price.
Moreover, there is a rating benefit for doing these transactions. In particular, the nationally recognized statistical rating organizations give credit for these transactions, which can raise the rating of the company, resulting in lower funding costs.
In addition, CRTs make good economic sense. Presumably, the mortgage insurers can pay less to lay off the risk than they are paid to take it. Finally, these transactions give the mortgage insurers information that is valuable for pricing the MI, through both the deal pricing and through discussions with investors.
Given these advantages, we would expect to see more credit risk transfer from these 
Credit Risk Transfer by Banks
Theoretically, we would assume commercial banks could also benefit from transferring the credit risk on some of their portfolio loans under certain circumstances. It would reduce the volatility of earnings and allow banks to hold larger mortgage positions in portfolio. One well-publicized deal was done-Chase 2016-1, a $1.88 billion CRT deal that contained more than 6,000 mortgages, all loans held by Chase in portfolio with approximately 75 percent qualifying under the GSE underwriting standards. Chase retained the servicing and the AAA assets and sold most of the lower-rated securities.
Why would they do this as a CRT transaction rather than as a private-label security?
Conceptually, they could do a senior-subordinate structure, retaining the AAA tranche and the servicing. If they did it as a senior-subordinate transaction, they would likely have to consolidate the entire transaction on the balance sheet. In addition, they would retain the mortgage servicing rights asset, which carries a heavy capital charge-250 percent capital if less than 10 percent of current assets and dollar-for-dollar capital charge if above that.
There were two regulatory hurdles that banks must satisfy to do CRT transactions.

The mortgages cannot be consolidated on the balance sheet if the bank becomes insolvent. That is, the investors need to have access to the collateral. The
JPMorgan Chase transaction was the first to rely on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation safe harbor.
The bank must receive capital relief for laying off the risk on the mortgages in portfolio. This was never granted, as there was no "true sale" on the mortgages, a condition for getting the regulators to recognize and approve the capital relief.
This discussion is distinct from what bank capital standards should be. It is merely asking if, in a capital framework, transferring the economic risk on a mortgage portfolio should allow for some capital relief.
The FHFA actions could cause bank regulators to reassess their view of the capital relief issue. The FHFA is working on a capital framework of the GSEs. This framework will likely include capital relief for the GSE CRT transactions. The FHFA has long discussed how these transactions serve to derisk the GSEs, by transferring this credit risk to the private markets. Assuming the FHFA capital framework includes capital relief for the GSEs, we believe it will put pressure on the bank regulators to revisit the capital relief issue for banks.
And if the capital relief were granted, we could see substantial activity in bank CRT, as a CRT structure offers these institutions numerous advantages over the senior-subordinate structure.
CRT Index Trading
Several Trading in CRT indexes could expand the use of CRT in several ways. First, it could bring in market participants that do not want to trade in the underlying, fully funded bonds.
Second, it would allow active institutions to take larger positions. In particular, we saw that trading volumes were limited. If an institutional investor wants to sell the securities, the liquidity might not be there. Thus, these investors might be reluctant to take large positions going in. If there was a mechanism to hedge these bonds, via trading in the indexes, these entities would be willing to take larger initial positions.
Trading in CRT indexes would bring better liquidity to the cash market as well, decreasing the cost to the GSEs of CRT. There are, however, some potential risks that will need to be monitored as a market emerges. If "speculators" swamp the market with shorts, volatility could increase and demand for the cash security diminish. This issue can be addressed through trading rules and regulatory oversight. But these concerns should not stop the orderly development of a futures or options market that is typically beneficial and complementary to cash markets.
Conclusion
With the increase in interest rates over the past 18 months, we have seen a sharp decrease in refinance activity, and we expect it will decline more. This decline will, all other factors constant, result in a drop in GSE CRT activity. The GSEs might be able to compensate for this by laying off more of the first-loss risk and more of the risk on the legacy book of business, but they are unlikely to be able to grow their volume.
Since the inception of the CRT program, the GSEs have increased the CAS and STACR volume and increasingly diversified their CRT options. With no increase in volume, the GSEs will be forced to decide whether they want to maintain CAS and STACR levels or send some of that volume into structures more reliant on institution-based capital.
Finally, we believe the expansion in CRT volume in the years ahead will come from sources other than the GSEs. The mortgage insurers are poised to issue more of this product because it is economic, it provides capital relief, and it reduces earnings volatility. The banks could also issue CRT if they were offered capital relief on the loans. The potential for trading in CRT indexes could also increase the interest in the basic product, both by reaching new investors and allowing existing investors to hedge their position if they cannot exit the product.
